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STUDENT COMMENT
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Inching Toward a
Determinable Standard of Proof in Political
Asylum Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
US_,107 S.Ct 1207 (1987), recently decided that the standard of "clear
probability" from section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
does not apply to section 208(a) asylum claims.
This article discusses both the holding and the scope of the Cardoza-
Fonseca decision and identifies the issues left open for further resolution.
This analysis reveals pertinent prior lower and Supreme Court cases as
well as applicable legislative history from the U.S. Congress and the
United Nations. Finally, the article discusses the need for a alternative
standard in asylum determination and the implications of the Cardoza-
Fonseca case in providing such a standard.
II. FACTS OF INS v. CARDOZA-FONSECA
On June 25, 1979 the Respondent, Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, ille-
gally entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor. After exceed-
ing the permitted stay, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
commenced deportation procedures against her. Respondent requested
withholding of deportation pursuant to section 243(h)1 and asylum as a
refugee pursuant to section 208(a).2 The Board On Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denied her claim for withholding of deportation under section
243(h) and political asylum under section 208(a). s The Respondent ap-
1. The Immigration & Nationality Act sec.243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) provides
withholding of deportation if an alien can show that "it is more likely than not that the
alien would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he would be returned.
2. The Immigration & Nationality Act sec.208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) permits a
discretionary grant of asylum by the Attorney General to an alien who has demonstrated
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(4).
3. In re Cardoza-Fonseca, File No. A24 420 980 San Francisco at 3 (BIA Sept. 1983).
The BIA converged the standards for withholding of deportation and political asylum by
maintaining the immigration judge's holding that the Respondent had not established a
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pealed the BIA decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which reversed and remanded for reconsideration. 4 The
case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and decided on March 9,
1987. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision.5
III. STATUTORY HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Contemporary asylum law can find its roots within U.S. assention to
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees'
("1967 Refugee Protocol" or "Protocol") Prior to this Protocol, relief was
available to any alien who was within the United States if the deportable
alien was subject to persecution upon deportation and could demonstrate
a "clear probability of persecution" or a "likelihood of persecution."7
Relief was generally unavailable at U.S. borders to aliens seeking ref-
uge due to persecution. Conditional entry was established in 1965 to ad-
dress the admission of refugees outside U.S. boundaries.8 Additionally,
the Attorney General was authorized to "parole aliens temporarily into
the country" for "emergency reasons" or for "reasons deemed strictly in
the public interest."9
Conditional entry was restricted by a numerical ceiling placed on ad-
mission and, as with the parole power, it was severely limited by the ide-
ology and geographic location of the applicant.0 It was the 1967 United
"clear probability of persecution." This was based on finding no difference between the clear
probability and withholding of deportation standards.
4. The court in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), found that the
Immigration Judge and the BIA erred in applying the clear probability standard of proof of
§ 243(h) to her § 208(a) asylum claim. Additionally, the court agreed with the Respondent's
assertion that the well-founded fear standard of 208(a) is more generous than the clear
probability standard of 243(h). The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and de-
cided March 9, 1987.
5. For a more comprehensive examination of the facts, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. .. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
6. The United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was opened for sig-
nature on January 31, 1967. 19 U.S.T. 6233, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. It was
ratified by the United States on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG. REc. 29,607 (1968). The Proto-
col incorporated the pertinent aspects of the "refugee" definition in article 1 and articles 2-
34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No.
6577 (hereinafter cited as the 1967 Protocol).
7. The Attorney General was authorized to withhold deportation of a deportable alien
under § 243(h) of the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964 ed.)
e.g. Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (CA 7 1967); In re Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866,
873 (BIA 1968); In re Kojoory, 12 I. & N. Dec. 215, 220 (BIA 1967).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-236 § 3, 79 Stat. at 913, repealed by 94 Stat. 107.
9. 1952 Act, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. at 188 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
(1976)).
10. Both remedies for overseas refugees had gross favoritism to those fleeing communist
countries. See World Refugee Crisis: The International Community's Response, Report to
the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979). This report shows a pre-
1968 use of parole power favoring total authorized Communist refugees, at 232, 711 to the
non-communist refugees at 925.
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Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," that set the stage
for contemporary asylum law. Assention to the Protocol bound each party
to the adopted provisions of the Protocol, including the definition of "ref-
ugee" as a person who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social




The sponsors of the Protocol, as well as the Senate and the Presi-
dent, were certain that assention to the Protocol would not interfere with
existing immigration law."3 Ratification of the Protocol brought a recogni-
tion by Congress that INS lacked conformity to the standards set out in
the Protocol. It became increasingly apparent to Congress that the INS
was not properly implementing practices and procedures of the Protocol,
but was using practices and procedures which were frustrating the imple-
mentation of the Protocol. Despite considerable flexibility permitted
under the withholding of deportation provision, the BIA retained the
clear probability standard. 4 Additionally, the courts lacked conformity in
a refugee eligibility standard. As Justice Stevens noted in INS v. Stevic,'6
the courts that reviewed withholding of deportation determinations after
the U.S. became a party to the Protocol differed in their application of an
appropriate refugee eligibility standard. Some courts used the well-
founded fear standard. 6 Other courts used the clear probability stan-
dard,1 7 while other formulations were conceived by other courts. 8 The
need for legislation to conform INS standards and practices to those of
the 1967 Protocol was not met until the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act
("Refugee Act" or "Act").' 9
11. See supra note 6.
12. 1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 6, art. 1(2) (directly incorporating the definition
of "refugee" contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(A)(2)).
13. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report shows experts and Protocol spon-
sors were unequivocal in their assurances that ratification of the document "would not im-
pinge adversely upon the federal and state laws of this country." S. Exec. Rep. No. 14, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
14. In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 72.
15. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
16. Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d
1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1975).
17. Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierre v. United States, 547
F.2d 1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962
(1977); Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976);
Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971).
18. Khalil v. District Director, 457 F.2d 1276, 1277 n.3 (9th Cir. 1972) ("would be perse-
cuted"); Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable persecution"); Daniel v.
INS, 528 F.2d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 920 (1971); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) ("likely"
persecution); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969) ("probability of persecution").
19. Prior to the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, bills were considered by the House of
Representatives to contain the "wellfounded fear" language. See Western Hemisphere Im-
migration Hearings on H.R. 367, H.R. 981, and H.R. 10323, before the House Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong.,
1987
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A. The 1980 Refugee Act
The Refugee Act was designed to bring the United States into con-
formity with the Protocol. This created significant changes in existing im-
migration law. First, the Act established a new standard of uniform and
non-ideological refugee eligibility. This was accomplished by incorporat-
ing the Protocol's definition of "refugee" into U.S. immigration law20 and
adding the asylum provision of section 208(a) to the INA.2 Additionally,
the Act amended section 243(h),22 eliminating the discretionary power of
the Attorney General by requiring that all aliens who meet the standard
for eligibility be granted withholding of deportation.2 The requirement
that an alien be subjected to persecution was substituted for the require-
1st & 2nd Sess. (1976).
20. Compare the definition included in the Refugee Act of 1980 which reads: The term
"refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwill-
ing to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion....
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982), with the definition embodied in the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol:
[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who... owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(July 28, 1951) [hereinafter referred to as the 1951 Convention], art. 1(A), as amended by
1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 6 at art. 1(2).
The joint explanatory statement of the Conference Committee on the bill which became
the Refugee Act observed that both the House and Senate versions of the bill incorporated
the Protocol's definition of refugee. H.R. conf. Rep. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 160. The conference report adopted the
House provision which "incorporated the U.N. definition, as well as Presidentially-specified
persons within their own country who are being persecuted or who fear persecution" and
excluded "persons who themselves have engaged in persecution." Id.
21. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 160. The asylum provision provides as follows:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the
United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to
apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney
General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning
of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
22. 8 U.S.C.§ 1253(h) (1982).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). Prior to 1980, section 243(h) provided that: "The At-
torney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States
to any country in which, in his opinion, the alien would be subject to persecution on account
of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems necessary for




ment that an alien just show that his life or freedom is threatened.2 4 Un-
fortunately, Congress failed to establish a definite standard for section
243(h) claims and this omission of an applicable standard has created nu-
merous disputes over the degree of proof an alien needs to present for
withholding of deportation. 5
Given the multifarious results of the Refugee Act in approaching a
refugee standard,2" it was only a matter of time before the Supreme Court
would hear a case on the withholding of deportation standard.
B. INS v. Stevic
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic27 was
whether Congress had intended to liberalize the standard of proof re-
quired to obtain withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the
Refugee Act. The case was brought up from the Second Circuit, which
ruled that the Refugee Act had adopted a more liberal "well-founded fear
of persecution" test in section 243(h) cases consistent with the interna-
tional standards in the 1967 Protocol.
2
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an alien must establish
a "clear probability of persecution" to avoid deportation under section
24. Id. As amended by the Refugee Act, section 243(h)(1) of the INA provides that:
"The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
25. For a discussion on the different interpretations over whether the statutory revi-
sions of the Refugee Act had changed the degree of proof an alien needs for § 243(h) claims,
see Helton, Political Asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act, An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 252-53 (1984).
26. The well-founded fear standard as set forth in § 101(a); definition of refugee con-
tributed to the inter-circuit dissension over the standard of proof applicable to § 243(h),
withholding claims, and § 208(a), asylum claims.
The Second and Sixth Circuits took the position that the well-founded fear standard
was more lenient than the clear probability standard. These courts applied the well-founded
fear standard to both withholding of deportation and asylum claims. See, e.g., Stevic v.
Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 1982) ("asylum may be granted, and under Section 243(h),
deportation must be withheld, upon a showing far short of a 'clear probability' that an indi-
vidual will be singled out for persecution"), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984); Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1982) (following Stevic v. Sava), vacated,
747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2173 (1985). In contrast, the Third
Circuit found no difference between the two standards and applied clear probability to both
withholding and asylum claims. See, e.g., Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982)
("We read 'well-founded fear' within the circumstances of its use and hold that it equates
with 'clear probability.' "). The Board of Immigration Appeals also equated the well-
founded fear standard with the clear probability standard following passage of the 1980
Refugee Act. See, In Re Lain, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 17-18 (BIA 1981); In re Salim, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 311, 314 (BIA 1982). This view was xejected by the Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984). See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
27. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
28. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982).
1987
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243(h)29 thus maintaining the BIA practice of construing the clear
probability standard to mean that it was "more likely than not that the
alien would be persecuted in the country to which he was being de-
ported.""0 In Stevic, equal deference should be given to what the Court
did not hold. It did not hold that the clear probability and well-founded
fear standards are synonymous.3 " It did not define the meaning of the
phrase "well-founded fear" of persecution. However, it did say that the
"well-founded fear standard is more generous than the clear probability
of persecution standard .. ."2
Failing to define the well-founded fear standard in asylum cases per-
petuated the incongruity between the circuit courts on the issue of
whether there is any difference between the clear probability standard for
withholding of deportation, and the well-founded fear standard for asy-
lum eligibility.33
29. Id. at 430.
30. Id. at 429.
31. Id. at 430.
32. Id. at 425. The court in Stevic seemed to lace this opinion with language of compro-
mise in a very controversial case. The New York Times, in its analysis of the court's may
shed some light into the court decision when it surmised:
The Court's failure to reach the asylum issue may indicate that the case was
more difficult than it appeared to be from the unanimous opinion. The narrow
treatment may have been the result of a behind-the-scenes compromise
designed to break a six-month deadlock. The case, I.N.S. v. Stevic [sic], No.
82-973, was argued Dec. 6, making it one of the oldest cases on the Court's
docket. The Court does not ordinarily take that long on a case it decides unan-
imously. New York Times, June 6, 1984.
33. The Third Circuit singularly contended that there is no difference between the
well-founded fear and clear probability standards. See Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir.
1984). The court was reaffirming its position in Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
The Sixth Circuit noted that the well-founded fear standard required a lesser showing than
the clear probability standard. See Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984). The
court in Youkhanna found that neither standard had been satisfied in that case. In contrast
to the Sixth Circuit's silence on the issue, the Seventh Circuit addressed the difference in
the evidence required for asylum and withholding of deportation. The court in Caravajal-
Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1985) indicated that the "clear probability" standard
requires objective evidence to corroborate the applicant's testimony, while "sometimes" the
applicant's testimony alone will be sufficient to meet the well-founded fear standard. See
Carava-jal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 562.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the well-
founded fear standard for asylum adjudication was easier to fulfill than the clear probability
standard for withholding of deportation. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282-83
(9th Cir. 1985). In Bolanos-Hernandez the court held that there was a clear probability that
the petitioner would be subject to political persecution if he returned to El Salvador. Id. at
1287-88. Specific threats against Bolanos-Hernandez were sufficient to establish a threat of
persecution, even though they were representative of the general level of violence in El Sal-
vador. Id. at 1284-85. Bolanos-Hernandez's neutrality constituted a political opinion. Id. at
1286-87. The court held that he had met the clear probability standard for withholding of
deportation and reversed the denial of his section 243(h) claim. Id. at 1287-88. Holding that
"an alien who has met the clear probability standard has, a fortiori, demonstrated a well-
founded fear of persecution," the court reversed and remanded the denial of Bolanos-Her-
nandez's section 208(a) claim. Id. at 1288.
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Additionally, Stevic's failure to instruct on the differences between
the "clear probability" standard for withholding of deportation and the
"well-founded fear" standard for asylum eligibility, preserved the BIA's
interpretation that the two standards converge.8 '
C. In Matter of Acosta
After years of inconsistency on the part of the BIA in interpreting
the standards of proof for section 208 and section 243,35 the Board In
Matter of Acosta"6 attempted to clarify its understanding of the well-
founded fear standard. In Acosta, the Board maintained its practice of
converging section 208 asylum claims and section 243 withholding of de-
portation standard when it concluded that in practical applications the
standards "converge. '3 7 The BIA based its determination of "well-
founded fear of persecution" on its understanding of congressional intent
when passing the Refugee Act.38 The BIA also methodically selected
favorable language from the UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Cri-
teria for Determining Refugee Status 39  ("UNHCR Handbook" or
"Handbook").
Acosta provided the BIA with a comprehensible opinion to base its
understanding and application of well-founded fear by merging the stan-
dard with the clear probability standard and requiring refugees to satisfy
the clear probability standard for their asylum claims. This burden of
proof was placed on Cardoza-Fonseca by the BIA in her claim for asy-
lum.40 The BIA, after ignoring Cardoza-Fonseca's argument that the clear
34. The BIA first converged the well-founded fear and clear probability standards of
§ 208 and § 243, respectively, in In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973) when the
Board announced that it believed that the clear probability of persecution standard was not
different from the well-founded fear of persecution standard found in the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.
35. The Board's interpretation of section 208(a) regarding the standard of well-founded
fear has been far from consistent. Compare Matter of McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, rev'd
on other grounds, McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring proof of actual
persecution), with Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (requiring "objective
evidence that [the applicant] has a well-founded fear that he is likely to be singled out for
persecution. . ."), and Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 358 (BIA 1983) (requiring that
the alien ". . . demonstrate a likelihood that he individually will be singled out and sub-
jected to persecution.")
36. Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (Mar. 1, 1985).
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 24. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVEN-
TION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979) [hereinafter
UNHCR HANDBOOK]. To the extent that the Handbook does not require an asylum seeker
to show that he is more likely than not to be persecuted, the Board rejects the Handbook as
inconsistent "with Congress' intention and with the meaning of the Protocol." In re Acosta,
Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 19, 25 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
40. See generally Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, File No. A24 420 980, San Francisco at 3
(BIA Sept. 1983).
1987
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probabllity standard was the wrong standard to apply to the asylum re-
quest,4' ruled that its conclusion would be the same whether it applied "a
standard of clear probability," "good reason," or "realistic likelihood" of
persecution." '
D. The Ninth Circuit In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS
In reversing the BIA decision,' the Ninth Circuit, in Cardoza-Fon-
seca, embraced a well-founded fear standard that was contrasted with the
clear probability standard by drawing a distinction between "probability"
and "possibility" of persecution.4 The court endorsed a formulation de-
rived from Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, an earlier Ninth Circuit case.45
The Bolanos court noted that an evaluation of "well founded fear"
includes an inquiry into the subjective element of the applicant's state of
mind, as well as objective elements like the conditions, the law and exper-
iences of others in the country of origin.4'The court's determination that
"well-founded fear '47 must be supported by objective evidence 48 must not
be coalesced with the BIA construction of "well-founded fear." The BIA
required that an individual's fear of persecution have a basis in objective
facts that shows a "realistic likelihood" of persecution. 49 The applicable
difference between the BIA and the Ninth Circuit's "well-founded fear"
language is the BIA's interpretation of "realistic likelihood" to mean a
clear probability of persecution,"0 whereas the Ninth Circuit interpreted
"realistic likelihood" to mean a reasonable existence of persecution.1
IV. INS v. CARDOZA-FONSECA OPINION
In Cardoza-Fonseca,"2 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "clear
probability" standard of proof for section 243(h), "withholding of depor-
tation," does not govern asylum applications under section 208(a).5 3 Jus-
41. Id. at 11.
42. Id. at 13.
43. See generally Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1450.
45. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 1282. The Bolanos court went on to say that one who has qualified for asylum
as opposed to withholding of deportation, may have established only the existence of a valid
reason to fear. Id. at 1285.
47. The court in Cardoza-Fonseca notes that the well-founded fear standard requires
that "the alien have a subjective fear." Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d at 1452.
48. The court requires that objective facts "support an inference of past or risk of fu-
ture persecution. That the objective facts are established through the credible and persua-
sive testimony of the applicant does not make those facts less objective." Id. at 1452-53.
49. In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 at 21 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
50. See id. at 25. See also Rozell Asylum Eligibility. The Proper Standard For Asylum
Eligibility Is A Well-Founded Fear Of Persecution, 26 VA. INT'L L.J. 1039, note 68 and ac-
companying text.
51. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452.
52. See generally, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
53. Id. at 1212-1215.
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tice Stevens, in a 6 - 3 majority, delivered the opinion of the court. After
an exhaustive examination of the legislative history surrounding the stan-
dards under sections 208(a) and 243(h), the majority concluded that the
statutory language of the 1980 Refugee Act indicates a congressional in-
tent that the two standards should differ. 4 The court based this conclu-
sion on the statutory language of sections 208(a) and 243(h). In section
243(h) the court notes that the "would be threatened" language "has no
subjective component." However, it requires that the alien "establish by
objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he... will be subject
to persecution."5 5 The court contrasted the section 208 standard by con-
cluding that the relevance to "fear" in the standard requires a subjective
mental state in the alien and this is the foundation for eligibility.56
Congressional intent to have separate standards for section 208 and
section 243, the court noted, was evident in the simultaneous drafting of
the section 208 standard while leaving the standard of section 243(h)
intact.
5 7
The court, in its examination of the Refugee Act and its language,
found it necessary to look at legislative history for support, despite its
conclusions that the plain language of the Act appeared to settle the
question before them." It found influential precedent which was coactive
with the Refugee Act in a historical interpretation in various bodies of
law.
A. Section 203(a)(7)
The first was the link between pre-1980 section 203(a) (7)9, and sec-
tion 207 standards 0 of admission. The court found that Congress was sat-
isfied with the procedural methods by which they dealt with refugees





58. Id. at 1213-1214. The court explained its examination of the legislative history with,
"In this case, far from causing us to question the conclusion that flows from the statutory
language, the legislative history adds compelling support to our holding that Congress never
intended to restrict eligibility for asylum to aliens who can satisfy § 243(h)'s strict, objective
standard." Id. at 1213-1214. See note 12 and accompanying text.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1151. This statute authorized "conditional entry" to a regulated arrival
of refugees fleeing from communistdominated areas of the Middle East based on "persecu-
tion or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion."
60. The Immigration and Nationality Act, § 207 - 8 U.S.C. § 1157, regulates the admis-
sion of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries. Compare section 207 with sec-
tion 208, which applies to refugees currently in the U.S. See supra note 2. Both look to
section 101(a)(42) for the statutory definition of "refugee." See also supra note 20.
61. The procedure was considered acceptable under the U.N. Protocol. However, the
court found that the geographical and political distinctions were unacceptable under the
Protocol. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1215.
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guage to be in conformance with the 1967 U.N. Protocol.12 The court con-
cluded that the requirements of clear probability of persecution "to show
a well-founded fear" would be an abrogation of congressional intent, and
that the standard for admission under section 207 is the same as the one
previously applied under section 203(a)(7).
The U.N. Protocol6 3 was, as the court concluded, the primary pur-
pose for the 1980 Refugee Act."4 The court traced back the Protocol's
definition of "refugees" and found that it was incorporated into the 1951
U.N. Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees,6 and eventually in-
corporated into the 1967 Protocol.
The court concluded that the standard of "well-founded fear" has
been consistently understood as not requiring an alien "to show that it is
more likely than not that he will be persecuted in order to be classified as
a refugee.
66
B. The UNHCR Handbook And U.N. Protocol
The court found additional assistance in separating the two sections,
208 and 243 respectively, in the UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.6 7 It concluded that the Hand-
book is consistent with the court's examination of the standard to be con-
sidered for "well-founded fear." The court noted that the applicant's fear
is well-founded when it is proven that staying in the country of origin has
become intolerable for reasons stated in the definition, or that it would be
intolerable if he/she returned, for the same reasons, and if this can be
established by a reasonable degree.6 "
The Handbook provides guidance in construing the Protocol and has
been widely used for establishing the obligations of the Protocol, the
court noted. 9 However, it was not suggested by the court that the Hand-
book binds the BIA to its reference with section 208."0
62. Id. at 1216-1217.
63. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
64. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. __, 107 S. Ct. at 1216.
65. The court found that the definition of "refugee" is found in the 1916 Constitution
of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which defined a "refugee" as a person who
had a valid objection to returning to his country of nationality, and specified that "fear,
based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, rtl:gion, nationality, or political
opinions..." constituted a valid objection. See IRO Constitution 1 § C annex 1 art. l(a)(i),
as cited in Cardoza-Fonseca, at 1216.
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 1951). The court noted that the Committee that drafted the
provision explained that "[t]he expression 'well-founded fear of being the victim of persecu-
tion . . .' means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show
good reason why he fears persecution." U.N. Rep. 39 as cited in Cardoza-Fonseca at 1216.
See also supra note 20.
66. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1215.
67. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 39.
68. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1217-1218.
69. Id. at 1217, and supra note 22.
70. Id. at 1217, and supra note 22. The suggestion of using the Handbook as guidance
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The court analogized the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees,71 articles 33.1 and 34, with sections 208 and
243, respectively, and concluded that section 243's and section 208's dis-
cretionary mechanism is "precatory" and, like article 33, does not require
the implementing authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are
eligible. 7" The court concluded that the Protocol's article 33.1 requests a
discretionary benefit for those aliens who qualify as refugees, while article
34 is an entitlement for the subcategory of those who "would be
threatened." This distinction between the broad class of refugees and the
subcategory entitled to section 243(h) relief is plainly revealed in the 1980
Act.
73
C. Rejection Of The Senate Bill
The court's exhaustive examination of pertinent legislative history
ended with a conclusion that congressional rejection of the Senate Bill"
under consideration preceding the passage of the 1980 Act in favor of the
House Bill;7 5 "demonstrates that Congress eventually refused to restrict
eligibility," for asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standards.7
D. Government's Arguments Rejected
The government asserted two primary arguments for converging the
section 208 and section 243 standards; both arguments were rejected by
the Court.7 7 The court found that the government's contention, that it is
anomalous for section 208 to have a less stringent standard than section
243, when section 208 provides greater benefits than section 243, is non-
sensical. The Court firmly rejected this argument when it said:
We do not consider it at all anomalous that out of the entire class of
for construing a "well founded fear" standard may have considerable consequences for fu-
ture interpretation and application of "well-founded fear." This is discussed in text and
accompanying notes 88-100.
71. 1961 Convention, supra at note 6. The court found that section 243(h) corresponds
with article 33.1 in that section 243(h)'s imposition of a "would be threatened if deported"
stems from article 33.1. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. __, 107 S. Ct. at 1218-1219, is compa-
rable to article 33.1's requiring an applicant to satisfy the burden of proving that he/she has
a well-founded fear of persecution, i.e. he/she is a refugee and that the refugee can show
that his/her life or freedom would be threatened. See id. at 1218.
72. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. .. 107 S. Ct. at 1218.
73. Id. at 1218.
74. Senate Bill, S.643, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
75. House Bill, H.R. 2816, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
76. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. .. 107 S. Ct. at 1218-1219.
The Senate Bill contained a provision which included the additional burden on a refu-
gee that he could not obtain asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited
under section 243(h)" S.Rep. 26. Thus, the court reasoned that the Senate's inclusion of this
additional requirement for section 208 relief indicates that the Senate recognized a differ-
ence between the "well-founded fear" standard of section 208 and the "clear probability"
standard of section 243. Id. at 1218.
77. Id. at 1219-1222.
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'refugees,' those who can show a clear probability of persecution are
entitled to mandatory suspension of deportation and are eligible for
discretionary asylum, while those who can show a well-founded fear of
persecution are not entitled to anything, but are eligible for the dis-
cretionary relief of asylum.
7 8
The court also rejected the government's second argument, that substan-
tial deference should be accorded the BIA's position of converging the
"clear probability standard" and "well-founded fear" standard. The court
reasoned that the issue of congressional intent to draft the standards as
identical is subject to statutory construction.7 9 This is not a question of
case-by-case interpretation left to administrative agencies, but an issue of
statutory construction of which the courts are the final authority.80
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell, in writing the dissenting opinion,8 found the BIA in-
terpretation of sections 208 and 243, respectively, "reasonable.""2
The dissenting opinion was drafted around three objections to the
Cardoza-Fonseca decision. The first was the view that legislative history
seems to indicate that congressional intent authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to apply their interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard
prior to 1980, and that this standard should carry over in adjudicating
asylum applications."
The dissent, in its second objection, found the majority's reliance on
the materials interpreting the U.N. Protocol, "marginally relevant.
8 4
Concluding that the materials encouraged a mathematical approach to
the likelihood of persecution, the dissent asserted that the BIA's rejection
of such an approach is consistent with the drafters of the Protocol. 5
Finally, the dissent objected to the majority's reliance on the Confer-
ence Committee's rejection of the Senate bill in favor of the House bill.8"
The difference between the two bills is insignificant, thus the Conference
Committee's choice of the language of the House bill is equally insignifi-
cant, the dissent concluded.
V. CONCURRING OPINIONS
A. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, provided an interesting
78. Id. at 1219.
79. Id. at 1220-1221.
80. Id.
81. Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White. Id. at 1225.
82. Id. at 1228-1229.
83. Id. at 1229.
84. Id. at 1229-1230.
85. Id. at 1230.
86. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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summation of the majority's downfalls in reaching a judgment, of which
the Justice concurs; but he objected to methods of reaching this conclu-
sion: "Since the Court quite rightly concludes that the INS's interpreta-
tion [of "well-founded fear"] is clearly inconsistent with the plain mean-
ing of that phrase and the structure of the Act, . . . there is simply no
need and thus no justification for a discussion of whether the interpreta-
tion is entitled to deference.""7
Justice Scalia further noted that the majority's excessively gratuitous
examination of legislative history raises the potential for misuse in the
principles of administrative law as well as the betrayal of the majority's
assurance that they were not setting forth a detailed standard for "well-
founded fear." '
One can only hope that Justice Scalia's conjecture becomes opera-
tional, thus providing the court with a detailed interpretation of the well-
founded fear standard, based on the UNHCR Handbook. The Handbook
has been widely circulated and approved by governments.8" Additionally,
the Handbook has been used in many judicial decisions in the interpreta-
tion of the 1967 Protocol,90 and since the 1980 Refugee Act was designed
to bring the U.S. into conformity with the 1967 Protocol, the use of the
Handbook for interpretation of "well-founded fear" is a consistent choice.
The need for the Handbook's guidance after the Cardoza- Fonseca
opinion is certain. Even though the majority clearly endorsed the Hand-
book as a legitimate interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard,
the court fell short in breathing substantive life into the standard, "but
instead left the task to the INS in a process of case-by-case
adjudication."01
87. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. at 1224. Justice Scalia is concerned
about what he views as an "unjustifiable" use of the majority's "superfluous discussion to
express controversial, and I believe erroneous, views." Id. at 1222 on refashioning important
principles of administrative law in cases in which such "questions are completely unneces-
sary to the decision." Id. at 1225.
88. See supra note 71 and Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1224, note 31.
Justice Scalia referred to the majority's endorsement of the UNHCR Handbook, which ex-
plains "well-founded fear" as:
In general, the applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can
establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of ori-
gin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or
would for the same reason be intolerable if he returned there.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 39 at Ch. II B(2)(a) § 42. See also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. at 1216.
89. Report of the 30th Session, U.N. Doc A/AC.96/572 (1979) at paras. 68, 72 (1)(h);
Report of the 31st Session U.N. Doc. A/AC. 96/5878 (1980).
90. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d
562 (7th Cir. 1984); Ananoh-Firempory v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (Ist Cir. 1985). Matter of Rodri-
guez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 965 (BIA 1980); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA
1982).
91. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. at 1221.
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B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, noted this eschewal of a
substantive attachment to the well-founded fear standard by the court,
and noted that he understood "the court has directed the INS to the ap-
propriate sources from which the agency should derive the meaning of the
well-founded fear standard.2 The need for a well-founded fear analysis
that examines the "subjective feelings of an applicant coupled with an
inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the fear," '93
was noted by Justice Blackmun. He found the necessity of such formula
based on INS' previous interpretation of the well-founded fear standard,
which was strikingly contrary to the plain language of the Refugee Act
and legislative history.
Justice Blackmun concluded that "while the INS need not ignore
other sources of guidance," the integration of the previously mentioned
well-founded fear formula "should be significant in the agency's formula-
tion...
VI. CONCLUSION
The Handbook's interpretation of "well-founded fear" provides satis-
factory guidance for such a formula. Expanding on the previously men-
tioned explanation of "well-founded fear" as construed by the UNHCR
Handbook, the definition of "well-founded fear" has been explicated in
the Handbook as follows:
Since fear is subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in
the person applying for recognition as a refugee. Determination of ref-
ugee status will therefore primarily require an evaluation of the appli-
cant's statements rather than a judgment of the situation prevailing in
his country of origin.9'
The Handbook recognizes that this element of fear is the added qualifica-
tion of "well-founded." It is a state of mind that encompasses not only
the frame of mind of the person in question that determines refugee sta-
tus, "but this frame of mind must be supported by an objective situa-
tion.""0 As mentioned above, the Handbook recognizes the importance of
the objective element in evaluating the statement made by the applicant.
However, the Handbook emphasizes that the ferr of the applicant, and
not the hypothetical likelihood of future events, is the central element of
the "refugee definition." 97 This evaluation sharply contrasts with conven-
tional forms of evidence which the INS expected to substantiate well-
92. Id. at 1223.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 39 at para. 38.
96. Id. at para. 40.




Thus, when INS converged the "well-founded fear" and "clear
probability" standards, as in Cardoza-Fonseca, its evaluation of the re-
spondent's political asylum claim sharply contrasted with the Handbook's
interpretation of "well-founded fear." Clearly, an applicant for asylum
might have a "wellfounded fear" of persecution long before "all or virtu-
ally all" of the members of his group had actually become victims of
persecution.0 9
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca fell short of a
precise determination of the necessary standard for asylum claims. The
effects of the Supreme Court's failure to specify what is a minimum likeli-
hood of persecution necessary to establish a well-founded fear are un-
clear. However, it is evident by the BIA's action in the Matter of Sanchez
and Escobar,100 decided subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Car-
doza- Fonseca,"1 ' that an inequitable denial of asylum can exist under the
standards laid out in Cardoza-Fonseca, based on a failure to satisfy the
objective element in the evaluating statement. 2
Additionally, the BIA can effectively close the gap between the two
standards by requiring evidence of selective persecution, i.e. that an indi-
vidual must show that he or she has been selected for persecution based
on specific facts,1 3 in order to satisfy the well-founded fear standard.
This BIA requirement of objective evidence falls short of the neces-
sary evidence to take into account what is "well-founded fear." The court
should not only take into account the general history of persecution in
the home country and the applicant's personal experience and that of his
or her family, (i.e. persecution based on race, religion, nationality, etc.)
but also the intensity of fear, the nature of the projected harm (i.e.death,
98. Id. at para 42. See also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
99. The use of "clear probability" or a comparable standard for determining refugee
status would require almost certainty of persecution. As noted by the petitioner in Stevic,
467 U.S. at note 26 and accompanying text, evidence to substantiate the "clear probability"
of persecution is "evidence of persecution of all or virtually all members of a group or class
to which the alien belonged..." Petitioner's Brief in INS v. Stevic at 9, 23 and notes 25 and
32.
100. Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Dec. No. 2996 at 5. (BIA Oct. 1985).
101. See generally Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. The BIA found that the standard delineated by the court did not change the out-
come in the Sanchez and Escobar Interim Dec. No. 2996 at 5 (BIA Oct. 1985). The BIA
denied Sanchez and Escobar's claim because they failed to establish "a clear probability of
persecution under section 243(h) or a well-founded fear of persecution under section 208(a)
of the Act, as that standard is described in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS." Id. at 14.
The BIA's denial of asylum and withholding was based on the objective limitations of
the applicant's fear of persecution. They failed to establish that their persecution was based
on or on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion as required by the Act. See Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Dec. at 12.
103. As noted above, the BIA requires that specific facts that show a selective persecu-
tion based on, or on account of, race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. See Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Dec. at 5.
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imprisonment, torture, detention, serious discrimination, etc.) and all
other surrounding circumstances.'" One can only hope, with the Supreme
Court's reliance on and endorsement of the UNHCR Handbook coupled
with the Supreme Court's conclusion that "well-founded fear" focuses on
the reasonableness of fear and not on the likelihood of events, that future
courts will apply the appropriate standard.
The need for a humanitarian standard is unequivocal. The harm
done by an erroneous decision, excluding a refugee from asylum status, is
often worse than that caused by a wrongful conviction. 10 5 The likelihood
of an erroneous decision transpiring is increased by an unrealistic stan-
dard of proof.106
An approach to an asylum determination which recognizes the grav-
ity of harm subsequent to an erroneous decision, and the special situation
of the applicant, would place the U.S. in accordance with its long history
of rhetoric'07 in welcoming the "huddled masses yearning to breathe
free."s
Jeff Jones
104. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d at note 45. This approach is illustrated by a
recent decision of the Higher Administrative Court, Hamburg, decision of April 11, 1983 -
OVG Bf. V 30182, InfAuslR 1983, p. 137, also published in Marx, 1 Asylrecht (1984) at 237-
8: "In case of serious sanctions such as death penalty or long-term imprisonment or severe
torture, it can be sufficient that the possibility of these sanctions being applied is not re-
mote." (Translation by UNHCR) (emphasis supplied). See also Benipal v. Ministers of For-
eign Affairs and Immigration, Action No. 878/83, 1016/83 (High Court of New Zealand, Nov.
29, 1985):
Clearly there are subjective and objective considerations in the application of
the definition to the facts. While as a matter of convenience it is useful to
distinguish between the two ingredients, it can lead to error to regard them as
separate and independent elements which can be considered in isolation. If
fear exists, the issue whether that fear is well-founded cannot be divorced from
the fear itself: it is in relation to the fear that the issue of 'well-founded' must
be decided, not in relation to anything else.... (at 228)
105. See supra notes 89, 95 and accompanying text.
106. Cf. Bayles, Principles for Legal Procedure, 5 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 30 (1986) at 33-
57.
107. The history of refugees and U.S. governmental rhetoric have their origins at the
foundation of the republic up to the present time. In 1783, George Washington proclaimed
America a land whose "bosom is open to receive the persecuted and oppressed of all na-
tions." George Washington's "Address to the Members of the Volunteer Association and
Other Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ireland Who Lately Arrived in the City of New York,"
Dec.7, 1973, in The Writings of George Washington, XXCII (GPA, Washington, D.C., 1983),
P. 244. More recently, President Ronald Reagan, in his acceptance speech for the Republi-
can nomination for President, said: "Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed
this land , this island of freedom here as a refuge for all those people who yearn to breathe
free? Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the iron curtain; the boat people of
southeast Asia,Cuba, and of Haiti; the victims of drought and famine in Africa; the freedom
fighters in Afghanistan." Ronald W. Reagan, "acceptance Speech, " Detroit, Michigan, July
17, 1980, p.8 . Unfortunately, President Reagan's speech was nothing more than rhetoric as
displayed by his Executive Order directing the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept boats laden
with Haitians sailing in the direction of the U.S. and tow them back to Port-au-Prince. See
President Ronald W. Reagan, "High Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens,"Exec. Order No.
12324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48109 (1981).
108. E. LAZARUS, "THE NEW COLOSSUS," POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS, 202 (The Riverside
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1982).
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